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The Human Right to a Clean and Healthy Environment in Climate Change
Litigation
Samvel Varvastian*
I. Introduction
Concluding her analysis on the climate law state-of-the-art back in 2008, Jacqueline Peel
observed: “The diversity of legal developments with respect to climate change [...] amply makes
the case that the last few years have witnessed the emergence of a new legal discipline, that of
climate change law. [...] The innovativeness of the case law in particular – decided as it was in
the absence of a national regulatory system for climate change – provides an encouraging
indication of the law’s capacity to evolve and adapt to deal with this new environmental
problem.”1 Ten years have passed and in their span, the world has witnessed a boom in climate
change litigation with plaintiffs invoking all kinds of legal strategies.2 One of the boldest
strategies employed by the plaintiffs has been the targeting of the very ambition of national
climate policies and using human rights law as the foundation of their claims. Several of these
cases have resulted in breakthrough victories.
Why is judicial intervention and innovativeness important within this field? To put it simply,
climate change is one of the most, or perhaps even the most stressing problem of our time;
therefore, dealing with it requires an “all-hands-on-deck” approach,3 mobilizing action well
beyond the shambling international negotiations. Fortunately, the need for global action is well-
understood and nearly-universally acknowledged.4 But then comes the hard part: taking that
action. At the time of writing, the world has crossed yet another dangerous line, with the Mauna
* PhD Researcher at the School of Law and Politics, Cardiff University. I am grateful to Anna Grear and Valerie
Fogleman for their support during the production of this paper. I would also like to thank Pedro Villarreal as well as
Stefania Negri and Stéphanie Dagron and other organizers and participants of the conference “Health and the
Environment in International Law: Actors, Norms and Responsibilities” held on October 17-18, 2018, in Max
Planck Institute for Comparative Public Law and International Law, Heidelberg, for their valuable feedback on this
paper. I am also grateful to Harro van Asselt for his comments on the earlier draft of this paper.
1 Jacqueline Peel, Climate Change Law: the Emergence of a New Legal Discipline, 32(3) Melbourne University Law
Review 922 (2008), at 977-978.
2 Comprehensive databases of global climate change litigation are maintained by Sabin Center for Climate Change
Law at Columbia Law School (available at http://climatecasechart.com/) and Grantham Research Institute on
Climate Change and the Environment at London School of Economics and Political Science (available at
http://www.lse.ac.uk/GranthamInstitute/climate-change-laws-of-the-world/).
3 Remi Moncel and Harro van Asselt, All hands on deck! Mobilizing climate change action beyond the UNFCCC,
21(3) Review of European, Comparative & International Environmental Law 163 (2012), at 164.
4 For example, the Paris Agreement, which “represents the most ambitious outcome possible in a deeply discordant
political context.” Lavanya Rajamani, Ambition and differentiation in the 2015 Paris Agreement: Interpretative
possibilities and underlying politics, International & Comparative Law Quarterly 65.2 (2016): 493-514.
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Loa Observatory in Hawaii reporting that atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide - a
powerful greenhouse gas (GHG) and one of the main “culprits” in anthropogenically-driven
climate change5 - averaged above 410 parts per million6 throughout an entire month for the very
first time in the history of monitoring.7 Apart from the fact that this is certainly not good news
for the planet’s climate, it is most troubling that such ominous reports are now practically
routine. Considering that the international awareness of climate change and the legal measures
dedicated to tackle it are nearly three decades old,8 one cannot help wondering, why the situation
is actually getting worse.
At this critical juncture, the development of climate change law might be expected to focus on
the most practical matters, employing solution-oriented approaches and learning from other
areas. This paper discusses one particular field of climate change law - climate change litigation
based on claims stemming from the right to a clean and healthy environment under national and
international human rights law9 - which is coming under increased scrutiny of both legal scholars
and practitioners. Although litigation may not necessarily be a panacea to climate crisis, the
development of this particular field is important in building a multi-level workable response to
climate change.10
II. Climate Change Litigation: A Panoply of Theory and Practice
Climate change has been a widely discussed topic over the last three decades and has attracted an
ever-growing public attention. Although some individuals, including politicians, still face the
idea of anthropogenically-driven climate change with a degree of skepticism or even outward
5 See, in general, IPCC, 2014: Climate Change 2014: Synthesis Report. Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III
to the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change [Core Writing Team, R.K.
Pachauri and L.A. Meyer (eds.)]. IPCC, Geneva, Switzerland, p. 151 ff., p 4.
6 The current concentration of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere is about 0.04%, having risen from pre-industrial
levels of less than 0.03% (280 parts per million).
7 Chris Mooney, Earth’s atmosphere just crossed another troubling climate change threshold, The Washington Post,
3 May 2018. https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/energy-environment/wp/2018/05/03/earths-atmosphere-just-
crossed-another-troubling-climate-change-threshold/?noredirect=on&utm_term=.1f329faaed0f
8 Thus, at the intergovernmental level, the issue of climate change emerged in the late 1980s, marking the period of
agenda-setting in what was to become the UN climate regime. See Daniel Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya
Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017), p. 99.
9  The United Nations Environment Programme describes the following three main dimensions of the
interrelationship between human rights and environmental protection: (i) the environment as a prerequisite for the
enjoyment of human rights (implying that human rights obligations of States should include the duty to ensure the
level of environmental protection necessary to allow the full exercise of protected rights); (ii) certain procedural
human rights, especially access to information, participation in decision-making, and access to justice in
environmental matters, as essential to good environmental decision-making (implying that human rights must be
implemented in order to ensure environmental protection); and (iii) the right to a safe, healthy and ecologically-
balanced environment as a human right in itself (noting, though, that this approach has been debated). See
<http://web.unep.org/divisions/delc/human-rights-and-environment>.
10 On the importance of courts weighing in on climate change see, e.g., Brian J. Preston, The Contribution of the
Courts in Tackling Climate Change, 28(1) Journal of Environmental Law 11 (2016); Hari M. Osofsky, The
Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation, Climate Law 1 (2010): 3-29.
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denial,11 the general consensus among scientists12 and universal recognition by the 1992 United
Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change13 as well as the subsequent international
treaties, and globally emerging climate legislation at national level14 make a more than enough
strong case in favor of recognizing the reality of climate change and humanity’s responsibility
for contributing to it.
Unfortunately, the recognition of human economic activity – primarily energy generation by
means of fossil fuel burning – as a factor significantly influencing the climate, has fallen short of
any concrete action scheme that could successfully mitigate this process.15 In the wake of this
regulatory failure, climate change litigation - a new and alternative pathway to climate change
governance - has been steadily making its way into global arena.16 Serving, at least in part, as a
regulatory gap-filler, it has been pushing the boundaries of traditionally passive, or altogether
absent climate policy for the last decade.17 Although scholarly studies have identified and
11 See, for example, Sander Van der Linden et al., Inoculating the public against misinformation about climate
change, Global Challenges 1.2 (2017): 1600008.
12 Various studies have estimated that approximately 97% of publishing climate scientists share the view that human
activities are the cause of recent global warming. See: John Cook et al., Quantifying the consensus on anthropogenic
global warming in the scientific literature, Environmental research letters 8.2 (2013): 024024; John Cook et al.,
Consensus on consensus: a synthesis of consensus estimates on human-caused global warming, Environmental
Research Letters 11.4 (2016): 048002.
13 United Nations, United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, Bonn, Germany: UNFCCC
Secretariat, 1992, http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/convkp/conveng.pdf
14 See Michal Nachmany and Joana Setzer, Global Trends in Climate Change Legislation and Litigation: 2018
Snapshot (London School of Economics and Political Science, 2018).
15 Thus, recent anthropogenic GHG emissions are the highest in history (IPCC, at 44) and the gap between what
governments have promised to do and the total level of actions they have undertaken to date remains substantial,
while both the current policy and pledge trajectories lie well above emissions pathways consistent with the Paris
Agreement long-term temperature goal (see, e.g., <https://climateactiontracker.org/>). For a discussion on
difficulties surrounding climate change governance see: Richard J. Lazarus, Super Wicked Problems and Climate
Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the Future, Cornell Law Review 94 (2009): 1153; Elizabeth Fisher,
Eloise Scotford, and Emily Barritt, The Legally Disruptive Nature of Climate Change, Modern Law Review 80.2
(2017): 173-201.
16 Hari M. Osofsky, The Continuing Importance of Climate Change Litigation, Climate Law 1 (2010): 3-29; Harro
van Asselt, Michael Mehling, and Clarisse Kehler Siebert, The Changing Architecture of International Climate
Change Law, in Research Handbook on Climate Change Mitigation Law, eds. Geert Van Calster, Wim
Vandenberghe and Leonie Reins (Edward Elgar, 2015): 24.
17 One of the most illustrative examples is Massachusetts v. EPA case, the very first climate change case that has
made all the way to the US Supreme Court. In this case, the plaintiffs, including the state of Massachusetts as well
as other states along with local governments and private organisations, alleged that the US Environmental Protection
Agency abdicated its responsibility under the federal air quality legislation to regulate automobile GHG emissions.
In a historic move, the Supreme Court acknowledged the existence of a causal link between GHG emissions and
climate change, and the impact of climate change on the environment, holding that the widely shared nature of such
an injury does not diminish the interest of concrete parties and emphasizing that the existence of other major GHG
emitters like China and India, should not preclude the US agency from its regulatory duty, even if the latter by itself
is unable to solve the global problem, since “[a] reduction in domestic emissions would slow the pace of global
emissions increases, no matter what happens elsewhere.” Massachusetts v. E.P.A 549 U.S. 497 (2007). Notably, in
his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Roberts (joined by three other justices) disagreed with such an interpretation,
claiming that there were critical difficulties in demonstrating causation and redressability that rendered the case
nonjusticiable. It must be observed that in the years to follow, the US courts have not shown consistency when
dealing with the issue of causation and redressability. See Samvel Varvastian, Access to Justice in Climate Change
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classified climate cases based on various criteria, so far, litigation revolving around the
environmental impact assessment legislation and air quality legislation has been the dominating
type of climate cases.18 Such litigation has been used with mixed success,19 mostly to challenge
the authorization of fossil fuel development and operations as well as action with regard to GHG
emissions standards.20 It is true, though, that in spite of the constantly growing number of climate
cases, their jurisdictional distribution has been very uneven; thus, only a few jurisdictions –
predominantly pertaining to the common law legal system (most notably the US and Australia) –
have established a body of relevant case-law so far.21 In those jurisdictions, litigation has become
an important feature of climate governance,22 regardless of numerous challenges and setbacks
that plaintiffs have encountered.23
Furthermore, with the ever-expanding body of climate cases,24 the topic of climate change
litigation has attracted significant attention of legal scholars, most notably from jurisdictions
with rich climate change litigation traditions.25 Following the first relatively large wave of
climate cases in the mid 2000s and up to the time of the adoption of the Paris Agreement,26 a
number of fundamental works have been published, reflecting the obvious need to classify such
cases and clarify their role within the emerging field of climate change law.27 These pioneering
works played a huge role in paving the way for a new generation of scholarship. Thus, in recent
years, scholarly works have begun focusing on more specific areas of climate change litigation
Litigation from a Transnational Perspective: Private Party Standing in Recent Climate Cases, in J. Jendrośka and M.
Bar (eds), Procedural Environmental Rights: Principle X of the Rio Declaration in Theory and Practice
(Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017).
18 See: Markell, D. and Ruhl, J. B. (2012) An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New
Jurisprudence or Business as Usual?, Florida Law Review 64(1), pp. 15-86; Lin, J. (2012) Climate change and the
courts, Legal studies, 32(1), pp. 35-57; Peel, J. and Osofsky, H. M. (2013) Climate Change Litigation’s Regulatory
Pathways: A Comparative Analysis of the United States and Australia, Law and Policy 35(3), pp. 150-183.
19 Sabrina McCormick et al. Strategies in and outcomes of climate change litigation in the United States, Nature
Climate Change (2018): 1.
20 Samvel Varvastian, Access to Justice in Climate Change Litigation from a Transnational Perspective: Private
Party Standing in Recent Climate Cases, 447-454, in J. Jendrośka and M. Bar (eds), Procedural Environmental
Rights: Principle X of the Rio Declaration in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017).
21 See: J. Peel & H. M. Osofsky , Climate Change Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy, 2015, pp. 16-
18; M. Wilensky, Climate Change in the Courts: An Assessment of Non-US Climate Litigation, Duke
Environmental Law & Policy Forum 2015 (26), p. 131.
22 J. Peel & H. M. Osofsky , Climate Change Litigation's Regulatory Pathways: A Comparative Analysis of the
United States and Australia, Law & Policy 2013 (35), at 175.
23 J. Peel & H. M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy, 2015, pp. 266-267.
24 The databases at Sabin Center and LSE reflect the steady rise in the number of such cases.
25 See, for instance, Elizabeth Fisher, Climate Change Litigation, Obsession and Expertise: Reflecting on the
Scholarly Response to Massachusetts v. EPA, 35(3) Law & Policy 236 (2013).
26 Paris Agreement under the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,
CFCCC/CP/2015/L.9/Rev.1.
27 It must be observed that these works have often applied different methodologies and terminology. See David
Markell and J. B. Ruhl, An Empirical Assessment of Climate Change in the Courts: A New Jurisprudence or
Business as Usual?, 64(1) Florida Law Review 15 (2012); Jolene Lin, Climate Change and the Courts, 32(1) Legal
Studies 35 (2012); Meredith Wilensky, Climate Change in the Courts: an Assessment of non-US Climate Litigation,
26(1) Duke Environmental Law & Policy Forum 131 (2015); Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change
Litigation: Regulatory Pathways to Cleaner Energy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015).
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(including the basis for different claims) and its application as well as drawing parallels to other
forms of environmental and health litigation. For example, these include: the role of public
health claims in climate cases;28 the relevance of experience in tobacco liability litigation and
other forms of litigation revolving around nationwide threats brought by states and cities to
climate change liability lawsuits against major fossil fuel companies;29 litigation against private
entities (fossil fuel companies);30 prospective international climate damages litigation31 and
litigation before international courts;32 the nascent interpretation of international
environmental/climate change law principles in national climate change litigation;33 the potential
of developing extreme event attribution science to help overcome causation challenges faced by
climate plaintiffs;34 the use of climate change litigation as a critical tool in shaping public
discourse and advancing the climate movement;35 the importance of considering “smaller”
climate cases36 and many more.
Given the fact that climate change has already affected and will continue to affect an array of
human rights, including the right to health, housing, food and water and, as the impact of climate
change worsens, even the right to life, the prospective violation of these rights by continuing
with “business as usual” climate policy is obvious.37 Therefore, it is quite fitting that litigation
28 Sabrina McCormick et al., The Role of Health in Climate Litigation, 108(S2) American Journal of Public Health
S104 (2018).
29 Christine Shearer, On Corporate Accountability: Lead, Asbestos, and Fossil Fuel Lawsuits, 25(2) New Solutions:
A Journal of Environmental and Occupational Health Policy 172 (2015); Martin Olszynski, Sharon Mascher and
Meinhard Doelle, From Smokes to Smokestacks: Lessons from Tobacco for the Future of Climate Change Liability,
30(1) Georgetown Environmental Law Review 1 (2017); Wes E. Henricksen, Peddling Ignorance: A New Falsity
Standard for Scientific Knowledge Fraud Cases, 86(2) UMKC Law Review 295 (2017); Sarah L. Swan, Plaintiff
Cities, 71(4) Vanderbilt Law Review 1227 (2018).
30 Geetanjali Ganguly, Joana Setzer and Veerle Heyvaert, If at first you don't succeed: suing corporations for climate
change, 38(4) Oxford Journal of Legal Studies 841 (2018).
31 Michael Byers, Kelsey Franks, and Andrew Gage, The Internationalization of Climate Damages Litigation, 7(2)
Washington Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 264 (2017).
32 Philippe Sands, Climate Change and the Rule of Law: Adjudicating the Future in International Law, 28(1) Journal
of Environmental Law 19 (2016); Daniel Bodansky, The Role of the International Court of Justice in Addressing
Climate Change: Some Preliminary Reflections, 49 Arizona State Law Journal 689 (2017).
33 Tracy Bach, Human Rights in a Climate Changed World: The Impact of COP21, Nationally Determined
Contributions, and National Courts, 40(3) Vermont Law Review 561 (2016); Patrícia G. Ferreira, Common but
Differentiated Responsibilities in the National Courts: Lessons from Urgenda v. The Netherlands, 5(2)
Transnational Environmental Law 329 (2016); Esmeralda Colombo, Enforcing International Climate Change Law
in Domestic Courts: A New Trend of Cases for Boosting Principle 10 of the Rio Declaration, 35(1) UCLA Journal
of Environmental Law & Policy 98 (2017); Cordelia Christiane Bähr et al., KlimaSeniorinnen: lessons from the
Swiss senior women's case for future climate litigation, Journal of Human Rights and the Environment 9.2 (2018):
194-221.
34 Sophie Marjanac and Lindene Patton, Extreme weather event attribution science and climate change litigation: an
essential step in the causal chain?, 36(3) Journal of Energy & Natural Resources Law 265 (2018).
35 Grace Nosek, Climate Change Litigation and Narrative: How to Use Litigation to Tell Compelling Climate
Stories, 42(3) William & Mary Environmental Law and Policy Review 733 (2018).
36 Kim Bouwer, The Unsexy Future of Climate Change Litigation, 30(3) Journal of Environmental Law 483 (2018).
37 See Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations relating to the Enjoyment of a
Safe, Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/52 (1 February 2016); Understanding
Human Rights and Climate Change. Submission of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the
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targeting the persisting governmental inertia with regard to climate change policy could employ
a rights-based approach, for instance, by invoking the right to a clean and healthy environment.
The question, however, is whether such claims could prove viable in a courtroom. While the
share of rights-based climate cases within the global body of climate change litigation is still
very insignificant, a number of such cases have already been heard by courts all across the globe.
The initial assessment of the existing case-law allows for cautious optimism that the use of
rights-based claims, notably, the right to a clean and healthy environment under national and/or
international law, is justified and can yield at least some positive results.
III. Rights-based Climate Change Litigation: The Right to a Clean and Healthy
Environment
The impact of climate change on human rights is well-documented in legal scholarship38 and
beyond.39 The relevance of considering human rights when dealing with climate change is also
explicitly referred to in the Paris Agreement,40 for the first time in the history of binding
multilateral climate treaties.41 Still, the appearance of rights-based climate cases on the global
stage of climate change litigation has been rather slow, despite the fact that the first attempts to
use rights-based claims in such cases date back to the mid-2000s.
The most notable example of this early litigation is Gbemre v. Shell case in Nigeria.42 The
petitioner, representing the Iwherekan community, alleged that the oil production activities (gas
21st Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (26 November
2015) <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/COP21.pdf>
38 See, for example, John H. Knox, Linking Human Rights and Climate Change at the United Nations, 33(2)
Harvard Environmental Law Review 477 (2009); Stephen Humphreys (ed.), Human Rights and Climate Change
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010); Anna Grear and Louis J Kotzé (eds), Research Handbook on
Human Rights and the Environment (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2015); John H. Knox, Human Rights
Principles and Climate Change in The Oxford Handbook of International Climate Change Law, edited by Kevin R.
Gray, Cinnamon Piñon Carlarne and Richard Tarasofsky (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016); Daniel
Bodansky, Jutta Brunnée and Lavanya Rajamani, International Climate Change Law (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2017); Sam Adelman, Human Rights in the Paris Agreement: Too Little, Too Late, 7(1) Transnational
Environmental Law 17 (2018); Sébastien Duyck, Sébastien Jodoin and Alyssa Johl (eds.), Routledge Handbook of
Human Rights and Climate Governance (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018); John H. Knox and Ramin Pejan (eds.), The
Human Right to a Healthy Environment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018); Journal of Human Rights
and the Environment (March 2010 – ), Edward Elgar Publishing, ISSN: 17597188.
39 Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Issue of Human Rights Obligations relating to the Enjoyment of a Safe,
Clean, Healthy and Sustainable Environment, UN Doc. A/HRC/31/52 (1 February 2016); Understanding Human
Rights and Climate Change. Submission of the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights to the 21st
Conference of the Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (26 November 2015)
<http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Issues/ClimateChange/COP21.pdf>
40 The Preamble to the Paris Agreement states the following: “Acknowledging that climate change is a common
concern of humankind, Parties should, when taking action to address climate change, respect, promote and consider
their respective obligations on human rights, the right to health, the rights of indigenous peoples, local communities,
migrants, children, persons with disabilities and people in vulnerable situations and the right to development, as well
as gender equality, empowerment of women and intergenerational equity”.
41 Adelman, supra note.
42 Jonah Gbemre v. Shell, NNPC and AGF, No FHC/B/CS/53/05 (Federal High Court, 2005).
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flaring) of the respondents (Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria Ltd and the
Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation) violated his rights to life and dignity, enshrined in the
Nigerian Constitution and the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, because they
adversely affected his life and health as well as the local environment. The Federal High Court of
Nigeria agreed with the petitioner and stressed that the above-mentioned constitutionally
guaranteed rights, reinforced by international human rights law, “inevitably include the rights to
a clean, poison-free, pollution-free, and healthy environment,” and that the respondents’ practice
“to flare gas in the course of their oil exploration and production activities in the applicant’s
community is a gross violation of their fundamental right to life (including healthy environment)
and dignity of the human person as enshrined in the [Nigerian] constitution.”43 True enough, it
was observed that despite its landmark nature, the decision had a number of weaknesses,44 and
did not halt the practice of gas flaring in Nigeria.45
Meanwhile another early attempt to use international human rights law, the Inuit petition to the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights seeking relief from human rights violations
resulting from the impacts of global warming and climate change caused by acts and omissions
of the United States,46 was rejected, although, as suggested by some leading climate law
scholars, “it probably has had some indirect regulatory influence, particularly in terms of
changing norms and values through increasing the public profile of Arctic climate change
impacts.”47
Considering the modern day rights-based climate change litigation, a distinction based on the
source of human rights claims, may be drawn between the US and non-US cases. In the United
States a rights-based approach has been systematically employed in climate change litigation
since 2011, also known as atmospheric trust litigation.48 The cases belonging to this category are
the result of a nationwide campaign, which seeks judicial recognition of the fact that the planet’s
43 Ibid., pp. 29-30.
44 See Kaniye SA Ebeku, Constitutional right to a healthy environment and human rights approaches to
environmental protection in Nigeria: Gbemre v. Shell revisited, Review of European Community & International
Environmental Law 16.3 (2007): 312-320.
45 See Wilensky, p. 143.
46 Petition to the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights Seeking Relief from Violations Resulting from
Global Warming Caused by Acts and Omissions of the United States (7 December 2005) (summary of the petition is
available at http://www.inuitcircumpolar.com/uploads/3/0/5/4/30542564/finalpetitionsummary.pdf. The petitioners
requested the Commission to recommend that the United States adopt mandatory measures to limit its GHG
emissions, consider the impacts of GHG emissions on the Arctic in evaluating all major government actions,
establish and implement a plan to protect Inuit culture and resources and provide assistance necessary for Inuit to
adapt to the impacts of climate change that cannot be avoided. See also Hari M. Osofsky, Inuit Petition as a Bridge?
Beyond Dialectics of Climate Change and Indigenous Peoples’ Rights, American Indian Law Review 31 (2007):
675.
47 Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky, Climate Change Litigation’s Regulatory Pathways: A Comparative
Analysis of the United States and Australia, Law & Policy 35.3 (2013): p. 160.
48 See Samvel Varvastian, A Natural Resource Beyond the Sky: Invoking the Public Trust Doctrine to Protect the
Atmosphere from Greenhouse Gas Emissions, 121-135, in Sustainable Management of Natural Resources: Legal
Instruments and Approaches, eds. Helle Tegner Anker & Birgitte Egelund Olsen (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2018).
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atmosphere is a natural resource covered by the common law public trust doctrine and the
government is under an obligation to protect it from dangerous GHG emissions.49 The
atmospheric trust litigation challenges the governmental climate policy at state and/or federal
level, and as the public trust doctrine is in some cases enshrined in constitutional law,50 its
interpretation with regard to the atmosphere as well as to the right to a clean and healthy
environment often has constitutional ramifications.51
There are several notable examples of this line of cases, all having a constitutional background.
One is Funk v. Wolf in Pennsylvania, where the petitioners sought the court's order to require the
respondents (the Governor of Pennsylvania, Pennsylvania Department of Environmental
Protection and other state officials and agencies) to carry out various studies, investigations, or
any other analyses to determine the impact of climate change on the rights established in the
constitutional provision, commonly referred to as the Environmental Rights Amendment, and to
establish a comprehensive regulatory scheme to reduce GHG emissions, thus satisfying their
constitutional obligations.52 Importantly, the constitutional provision that the petitioners referred
to, explicitly granted environmental human rights53 by providing that
“The people have a right to clean air, pure water, and to the preservation of the natural,
scenic, historic and esthetic values of the environment. Pennsylvania's public natural
resources are the common property of all the people, including generations yet to come.
As trustee of these resources, the Commonwealth shall conserve and maintain them for
the benefit of all the people.”54
The interpretation of this provision in earlier case-law by the state supreme court seemed to
favour the plaintiffs.55 However, in Funk v. Wolf the court used a narrow interpretation of this
49 The public trust doctrine requires government to hold vital natural resources in trust for the public beneficiaries,
thus protecting those resources from monopolization or destruction by private interests. See Mary Christina Wood
and Charles W. Woodward IV, Atmospheric Trust Litigation and the  Constitutional Right to a Healthy Climate
System: Judicial Recognition at Last, 6(2) Washington Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 633 (2016), at
647-648.
50 See Alexandra B. Klass, The Public Trust Doctrine in the Shadow of State Environmental Rights Laws: A Case
Study, 45(2) Environmental Law 431 (2015); Sam Kalen, An Essay: An Aspirational Right to a Healthy
Environment, 34(2) UCLA Journal of Environmental Law & Policy 156 (2016).
51 See Michael C. Blumm and Mary Christina Wood, No Ordinary Lawsuit: Climate Change, Due Process, and the
Public Trust Doctrine, 67(1) American University Law Review 1 (2017).
52 Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d 228 ( Pa.Cmwlth. 2016). See also the commentary of this case in Samvel Varvastian,
Climate Change and the Constitutional Obligation to Protect Natural Resources: The Pennsylvania Atmospheric
Trust Litigation, (2017) Climate Law 7(2-3), 209-226.
53 See Robinson Twp., Washington Cnty. v. Commonwealth , 83 A.3d 901, at 962-963 (Pa. 2013): “The decision to
affirm the people's environmental rights in a Declaration or Bill of Rights, alongside political rights, is relatively
rare in American constitutional law. In addition to Pennsylvania, Montana and Rhode Island are the only other states
of the Union to do so.”
54 Pa. Const. Art. 1, § 27. The amendment was adopted on 18 May 1971.
55 With regard to the special place of the provision in the context of other state constitutions, the Supreme Court of
Pennsylvania stated the following: “That Pennsylvania deliberately chose a course different from virtually all of its
sister states speaks to the Commonwealth's experience of having the benefit of vast natural resources whose virtually
unrestrained exploitation, while initially a boon to investors, industry, and citizens, led to destructive and lasting
consequences not only for the environment but also for the citizens' quality of life. Later generations paid and
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provision, stating that it does not provide absolutist priority to the environmental rights and
instead, requires from the policymakers to weigh conflicting environmental and social concerns
in making their decisions.56 Therefore, the court concluded that the petitioners did not have a
clear right to have the respondents perform the requested actions.57
In another similar case, Foster v. Ecology, the petitioners requested the government of the
Washington state to implement rules that would ensure carbon dioxide emissions are reduced at
levels scientifically required to protect the oceans from acidification and the climate system from
further disruption.58 The plaintiffs based their claims on the public trust doctrine under state
constitution.59 And although the Superior Court of Washington did not explicitly expand the state
public trust doctrine to encompass the atmosphere, it acknowledged that the planet’s climate
forms an integral part of the global environment,60 thus its protection should fall within the scope
of environmental human rights, concluding that “if ever there were a time to recognize through
action [the] right to preservation of a healthful and pleasant atmosphere, the time is now.”61
Conversely though, another judge of the same court refused to back this position in a follow-up
case Aji P. v. State of Washington, stating that there is no fundamental constitutional right “to a
healthful and pleasant environment, which includes a stable climate system that sustains human
life and liberty”, to be found within state constitution.62 Moreover, the judge relied on an opinion
in a case concerning local environmental contamination, where a federal court in Michigan stated
that “whenever federal courts have faced assertions of fundamental rights to a ‘healthful
environment’ or to freedom from harmful contaminants, they have invariably rejected those
claims.”63
continue to pay a tribute to early uncontrolled and unsustainable development financially, in health and quality of
life consequences, and with the relegation to history books of valuable natural and esthetic aspects of our
environmental inheritance. The drafters and the citizens of the Commonwealth who ratified the Environmental
Rights Amendment, aware of this history, articulated the people's rights and the government's duties to the people in
broad and flexible terms that would permit not only reactive but also anticipatory protection of the environment for
the benefit of current and future generations.” Robinson Twp., 83 A.3d at 963.
56 Funk v. Wolf, 144 A.3d, at 233-234.
57 Ibid., at 250-251. In other words, in interpreting the abovementioned constitutional provision, the court followed
the approach of some other US courts, interpreting constitutional provisions as non-self-executing and thus barring
the plaintiffs from invoking it due to the absence of “precise regulations and standards governing the topic”. See on
this Dinah Shelton, Complexities and Uncertainties in Matters of Human Rights and the Environment: Identifying
the Judicial Role, in John H. Knox and Ramin Pejan (eds.), The Human Right to a Healthy Environment
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018), p. 101.
58 Foster v. Wash. Dep’t of Ecology, No. 14-2-25295-1 SEA, 2015 WL 7721362, at 1 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2015).
59 Ibid., at 3-4.
60 Judge Hill described the link between the atmosphere and other natural resources in the following way: “the
navigable waters and the atmosphere are intertwined and to argue a separation of the two, or to argue that GHG
emissions do not affect navigable waters is nonsensical” (at 8).
61 Ibid.
62 Aji P. v. State of Washington, No. 18-2-04448-1, 2018 WL 3978310. At 7 (Wash. Super. Ct. 2018).
63 Lake v. City of Southgate, No. 16-10251, WL 767879 (slip op.) (E.D. Mich. 2017).
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It is important to note that this position, as observed by both Michigan and Washington state
courts themselves,64 is not exactly accurate, since it contradicts the 2016 findings in the ongoing
atmospheric trust litigation at the federal level, Juliana v. United States.65 The case was brought
by a group of children against the US President and a number of federal agencies, challenging
numerous decisions taken by the defendants, such as “whether and to what extent to regulate
[carbon dioxide] emissions from power plants and vehicles, whether to permit fossil fuel
extraction and development to take place on federal lands, how much to charge for use of those
lands, whether to give tax breaks to the fossil fuel industry, whether to subsidize or directly fund
that industry, whether to fund the construction of fossil fuel infrastructure such as natural gas
pipelines at home and abroad, whether to permit the export and import of fossil fuels from and to
the US, and whether to authorize new marine coal terminal projects.”66 According to the
plaintiffs, the defendants have known for more than fifty years that carbon dioxide produced by
burning fossil fuels was destabilizing the climate system, significantly endangering the plaintiffs,
yet despite that knowledge, they exercised the sovereign authority over the country's atmosphere
and fossil fuel resources in such a way that permitted, encouraged, and enabled continued
exploitation, production and combustion of fossil fuels, thus deliberately allowing atmospheric
concentrations of carbon dioxide to escalate to unprecedented levels.67 The plaintiffs asserted
that the defendants’ decisions have substantially caused the planet to warm and the oceans to
rise, thus drawing a direct causal line between defendants’ policy choices and floods, food
shortages, destruction of property, species extinction, and various other harms.68 Accordingly,
the plaintiffs based their lawsuit on constitutional grounds69 as well as the public trust doctrine.
And the federal judge Ann Aiken, who heard the case, made history, by stating that exercising
“reasoned judgment,” there is “no doubt that the right to a climate system capable of sustaining
human life is fundamental to a free and ordered society.”70
Meanwhile, outside of the United States, rights-based climate change litigation is currently
underway in more than a dozen jurisdictions and some of these cases are drawing considerable
global attention. The extent to which the rights-based approach is used in those cases, however,
may be different. So far, the most prominent case is Urgenda v. The Netherlands, which is an
excellent example of employing the provisions of a national constitution to protect the climate.
The plaintiffs successfully invoked Article 21 of the Dutch Constitution, which provides that
“[i]t shall be the concern of the authorities to keep the country habitable and to protect and
64 Ibid., see fn. 3.
65 Juliana v. United States, 217 F.Supp.3d 1224 (D. Or. 2016).
66 Ibid., at 1234.
67 Ibid., at 1233.
68 Ibid., at 1234.
69 Among other things, the plaintiffs based their arguments on the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment to
the US Constitution, barring the federal government from depriving a person of “life, liberty, or property” without
“due process of law.” According to the plaintiffs, this violation resulted from the defendants’ lax climate policy,
favouring the fossil fuel industry. Ibid., at 1248,
70 Ibid., at 1250.
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improve the environment”.71 The Hague District Court was persuaded that the state had a
constitutional obligation to take stronger measures to mitigate climate change. It ordered the state
“to limit the joint volume of Dutch annual greenhouse gas emissions, or have them limited, so
that this volume will have reduced by at least twenty five per cent at the end of 2020 compared
to the level of the year 1990”.72 And while the case primarily revolved around the interpretation
of the duty of care, the human rights dimension invoked by the plaintiffs (namely, Articles 2 and
8 of the European Convention on Human Rights)73 also played an important role in the court’s
analysis, and was “applied as an interpretative tool that assisted the Court in reaching its ultimate
finding regarding the existence of a relevant duty of care and its breach”.74 The Hague Court of
Appeal upheld the District Court's ruling, concluding that the State’s failure to pursue a more
ambitious GHG reduction is unlawful, as it contravenes the duty of care under the
abovementioned articles of the European Convention on Human Rights.75
Apart from the Urgenda case, there is a number of other cases in which petitioners have raised
human rights claims, albeit with mixed success. For example, in the Pakistani case Leghari v.
Pakistan, the human rights claims were central, with the plaintiff successfully alleging the
government’s violation of his constitutional rights to life and dignity, enshrined in Pakistan’s
Constitution by delaying the implementation of the National Climate Change Policy and failing
to address vulnerabilities associated with climate change.76 Similarly, human rights claims were
at the core of the Colombian case Future Generations v. Ministry of the Environment, where
plaintiffs successfully invoked constitutionally recognized rights to a healthy environment, life,
health, food, and water in challenging the government’s inaction with regard to deforestation in
the Amazon region, that, according to the plaintiffs, greatly contributed to the total volume of
GHG emissions in the country and therefore, climate change.77 In this case, the constitutional
right to a clean and healthy environment was instrumental in plaintiffs’ success.
71 Urgenda Foundation v. The State of the Netherlands, C/09/456689 / ha za13–1396 (the Hague District Court,
2015), <https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2015:7196> para. 2.69.
72 Ibid., para. 5.1. It is worth mentioning that throughout its decision, the court had to operate within the complex
synthesis of Dutch constitutional and civil law, international climate and human rights law, EU law and the scientific
data provided by the IPCC.
73 The human rights mechanisms invoked in this case, thus, pertain to international human rights law.
74 Jacqueline Peel and Hari M. Osofsky, A Rights Turn in Climate Change Litigation?, Transnational
Environmental Law 7.1 (2018): 50. According to the court, Urgenda itself could not be designated as a direct or
indirect victim of a violation of articles 2 and 8 within the meaning of the Convention; however, both articles and
their interpretation given by the European Court of Human Rights, particularly with respect to environmental right
issues, can serve as a source of interpretation when detailing and implementing open private-law standards, such as
the unwritten standard of care (paras 4.45-4.46).
75 The State of the Netherlands v Urgenda Foundation, The Hague Court of Appeal (9 October 2018), case
200.178.245/01 < https://uitspraken.rechtspraak.nl/inziendocument?id=ECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:2610> para. 76.
76 Lahore High Court in Ashgar Leghari v. Federation of Pakistan , w.p. No. 25501/2015 (2015) (the two Court
orders are available at <https://elaw.org/system/files/pk.leghari.091415_0.pdf> and
<https://elaw.org/system/files/pk.leghari.090415_0.pdf>), at 6.
77 Future Generations v. Ministry of the Environment, STC4360 (2018) <http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-
change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2018/20180405_11001-22-03-000-2018-
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Meantime, while not central to the plaintiffs’ claims, human rights were also invoked in
Austrian78 and South African79 climate cases. Both cases revolved around environmental impact
assessment, yet both featured rights claims – a constitutional right to a clean and healthy
environment in the latter case and a combination of European Union (EU) primary law
concerning human rights (namely Article 37 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights, calling for a
high level of environmental protection to be integrated into EU policies) and provisions of the
national constitution establishing the principle of sustainability and comprehensive
environmental protection in the former case. In both cases the courts used the above-mentioned
provisions as interpretative tools. At the same time, plaintiffs in similar rights-based Irish80 and
Norwegian81 climate lawsuits challenging governmental permits to activities resulting in GHG
emissions were less successful, although in both cases the respective courts recognized the
constitutional right to a clean and healthy environment that may well be the foundation for future
litigation in these countries.82
Furthermore, considering the growing importance of internationalization in climate change
litigation, sooner or later, the issue of climate change and human rights will likely have to be
addressed not only by national, but also by international courts. To some extent, this has already
happened: for instance, the recent advisory opinion issued by the Inter-American Court of
00319-00_decision.pdf>. Similar to the Urgenda case, the plaintiffs did not suffer direct harm derived from the
deforestation of the Amazon region. Instead, they argued that an omission by the authorities led to this problem.
78 In re Vienna-Schwechat Airport Expansion, <http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-
content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2017/20170202_W109-2000179-1291E_decision-3.pdf>.
79 EarthLife Africa Johannesburg v. Minister of Environmental Affairs and Others,
<http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-
documents/2017/20170306_Case-no.-6566216_judgment.pdf>.
80 Friends of the Irish Environment CLG v. Fingal County Council, <http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-
change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-documents/2017/20171121_2017-No.344-
JR_judgment.pdf>.
81  Greenpeace Nordic Ass’n and Nature and Youth v. Ministry of Petroleum and Energy,
<http://blogs2.law.columbia.edu/climate-change-litigation/wp-content/uploads/sites/16/non-us-case-
documents/2018/20180104_16-166674TVI-OTIR06_judgment-2.pdf>.
82 For example, in the Norwegian case, the parties have agreed that both environmental harm in a narrow sense and
climate deterioration are covered by the Article 112 of the Norwegian constitution, which provides that:
Every person has the right to an environment that is conducive to health and to a natural environment
whose productivity and diversity are maintained. Natural resources shall be managed on the basis of
comprehensive long -term considerations which will safeguard this right for future generations as well.
In order to safeguard their right in accordance with the foregoing paragraph, citizens are entitled to
information on the state of the natural environment and on the effects of any encroachment on nature that is
planned or carried out.
Meanwhile, in Ireland, the court went even further in its interpretation of the right in question, stating that
“A right to an environment that is consistent with the human dignity and well-being of citizens at large is
an essential condition for the fulfilment of all human rights. It is an indispensable existential right that is
enjoyed universally, yet which is vested personally as a right that presents and can be seen always to have
presented, and to enjoy protection, under [...] the Constitution. It is not so utopian a right that it can never
be enforced. Once concretised into specific duties and obligations, its enforcement is entirely practicable.”
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Human Rights has found that the right to a healthy environment is a human right83 and
specifically recognized the adverse effect of climate change on human rights.84 This advisory
opinion emphasized the interdependence and indivisibility between human rights, the
environment and sustainable development, since the full enjoyment of all human rights depends
on a favorable environment.85 Even more so, the Court stressed that numerous human rights
protection systems recognize the right to a healthy environment as a right in itself, although it
expressed no doubt that other human rights are also vulnerable because of environmental
degradation, which prompts a series of environmental obligations for governments to ensure that
they comply with their duties to respect and ensure those rights.
Finally, one might remember the dissenting opinion of judge ad hoc Dugard in the International
Court of Justice case Costa Rica v. Nicaragua issued in early 2018 and concerning the
compensation owed by Nicaragua to Costa Rica.86 A part of that opinion specifically addressed
the question of climate change liability resulting from deforestation, referring to the Paris
Agreement and going as far as stating that “the obligation not to engage in wrongful
deforestation that results in the release of carbon into the atmosphere and the loss of gas
sequestration services is certainly an obligation erga omnes”; in other words, implying that the
issue of climate change mitigation and, accordingly, state liability, is a matter of concern to the
international community as a whole.
Concluding remarks
While international climate negotiations and domestic climate policies continue to be the main
pillar of climate policy, litigation has played a significant role in shaping the contemporary
climate change law. Following the initial and isolated attempts to fill in the regulatory gaps left
by the policymakers, litigation has significantly expanded and enriched from a diverse spectrum
of legal theories used by the parties over the last several years. Time will tell whether the legal
mechanism analysed above proves instrumental in the long run; for now, at least, this scenario
does not seem to be unrealistic. Although the discussed litigation pertains to a specific area of
climate change law, it has already demonstrated a potentially broader reach and interaction with
other areas. That said, it also has to be acknowledged that there are certain challenges when
83 Under the Inter-American human rights system, the right to a healthy environment is recognized explicitly in
Article 11 of the San Salvador Protocol: 1) Everyone shall have the right to live in a healthy environment and to
have access to basic public services; 2) The States Parties shall promote the protection, preservation, and
improvement of the environment.
84 The Environment and Human Rights (State Obligations in Relation to the Environment in the Context of the
Protection and Guarantee of the Rights to Life and to Personal Integrity – Interpretation and Scope of Articles 4(1)
and 5(1) of the American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-23/18, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R., (ser. A)
No. 23 (Nov. 15, 2017), <http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_23_esp.pdf> (in Spanish).
85 For a discussion on the potential role of this advisory opinion see Christopher Campbell-Duruflé and Sumudu
Anopama Atapattu, The Inter-American Court’s Environment and Human Rights Advisory Opinion: Implications
for International Climate Law, Climate Law 8.3-4 (2018): 321-337.
86 Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicar.), compensation owed by the
Republic of Nicaragua to the Republic of Costa Rica, General List No. 150, at para. 42 (Int’l Ct. Just. Feb. 2, 2018),
dissenting opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Dugard.
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assessing the overall relevance of case-law within different jurisdictions and the potential
transposition of experience from one jurisdiction into others. For instance, different procedural
requirements related to standing, etc., may play a decisive role in determining whether a case in
any given jurisdiction can be successful or not.87 But ultimately, the ingenuity of scholars and
practitioners searching for the most effective legal strategies might be viewed as a sign of
constant progress which permeates the entire field of climate change law.
87 See, for example, Samvel Varvastian, Access to Justice in Climate Change Litigation from a Transnational
Perspective: Private Party Standing in Recent Climate Cases, in J. Jendrośka and M. Bar (eds), Procedural
Environmental Rights: Principle X of the Rio Declaration in Theory and Practice (Cambridge: Intersentia, 2017);
Dinah Shelton, Complexities and Uncertainties in Matters of Human Rights and the Environment: Identifying the
Judicial Role, in John H. Knox and Ramin Pejan (eds.), The Human Right to a Healthy Environment (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2018).
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